Appendix 0 -The budget process 1719-2003
The budget process is one determinant of the state's revenues and incomes, which in turn determine the deficit and the evolution of government debt. In this section we briefly describe its salient features. Larger changes occurred with the new constitutions in 1719, 1772, 1809 and 1974 and the budget law in 1996, but with considerable continuity across these breaks.
Here we lay out the formal rules governing the budget process (statsreglering), in particular the relation between the executive and the parliament, but we do not discuss the political economy of the budget process. The studied period begins with the death of the despotic king Karl XII in 1718. The parliament (the Riksdag) ruled supremely between 1719 and 1772 with an elected executive with the king as its figurehead. The parliament gained full power over the government budget, that is, both revenues and expenditures, in the new constitution 1719 (rewritten in 1720). An exception was the executive's right to levy a war tax in emergencies (krigsgärd). The parliament had controlled taxation since medieval times, except under Karl XII, while expenditures had been the executive's prerogative. The parliament's new power over expenditures emanated from the stipulation in the constitution of 1720 that a budget proposal (riksstat) should be constructed on a yearly basis by a special commission appointed by the parliament (Statsdeputationen during parliamentary meetings and Statskommissionen between), assisted by the executive's budget office (Statskontoret) . A parliamentary committee, Sekreta utskottet, decided the final budget until 1765. From 1765, the whole parliament approved the budget.
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In principle, the system was set up to balance the budget continuously, that is, not for tax smoothing. In practice, budget deficits and borrowing came to characterize most years between 1740 and 1809. The budgetary work followed the old principle of earmarking taxes for specific purposes, designed to keep the whole budget in balance by balancing each area as such. Over time the system became less constrictive as areas were consolidated. The budgets included a deficit 1751 for the first time, which should be closed by the executive. This statutory deficit was termed "State deficit" (statsbrist). The official budget contained deficits from 1757 continuously to 1777, irregularly from 1778 to 1790, and then every year from 1791 to 1809. Without the power of taxation, the executive could close the deficit by: (i) reducing expenditures, (ii) improving the collection of taxes, (iii) increase the non-tax 1 The formal rules before 1974 are summarized in Nordisk familjebok (second edition, "Riksstat" and "Statsreglering"). More detailed descriptions can be found in Åmark (1961) and Lagerroth (1928) for the 18 th century and in Herlitz (1934) for the period after 1809. Descriptions of the budget process in English are available in the yearbook of Riksgäldskontoret from 1925/26 to 1936/37. 2 The budget did not have the form of a law and therefore did not need the signature of the executive (the king in a constitutional monarchy). This is a peculiarity in an international context, which was retained in the new constitution in 1809 and preserved until today.
incomes of the state, such as custom duties or, (iv) if these efforts failed, borrowing. As it turned out a frequent way out became borrowing, in particular at the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank. 3 Borrowing as an independent source of income in the budgets, that is, projected budget deficits, appeared from 1747, but began with the war 1741-1743, which was financed outside the ordinary budget. Borrowing at the Riksbank was provided against specific taxes as collateral, which collection was administered by the Riksbank.
The parliament lost all power over the budget process with the coup d'état 1772 by Gustav III. The budget was presented to the parliament only for inspection so that "they would see that the means of the state were properly used" (regeringsformen 1772, §50). The parliament, however, retained its right over taxation. The executive though took control of foreign subsidies and foreign borrowing, which went through a newly created office, Kungliga finansförvaltningen. Thus the executive controlled all expenditures and non-tax revenues.
A new constitution was set in place in 1809 after a coup d'état, which reasserted the Parliament's full control over the budget (finansmakten). The basic provision is that the executive must carry out the decided expenditures, but can not spend more, nor use unexpected surpluses. The executive though has some influence over the budget. First, the executive presents a budget bill (statsverkspropositionen) with suggested expenditures, forecasted incomes and suggestions for new taxes. Second, the non-tax revenues can be changed by the executive through changes in fees, custom duties etc. Third, the executive can neglect to carry out expenditures, if they require the use of the economic power of the executive and the executive considers such use to be contrary to the interest of the nation. Fourth, in case of emergencies (war, plagues etc), the executive may borrow to finance new expenditures up to a preset limit. These limits constitute credit lines that are not included in the budget.
The basic rules in the constitution 1809 have remained until today, as the constitution in 1974 that replaced the 1809 constitution did not materially change the parliament's control over the budget, nor the executive's prerogative to present the budget bill. The political economy behind the budget process has of course changed dramatically since 1809; in particular in 1866 when the estate parliament was replaced by a bicameral system and in 1921 with the introduction of the general franchise. A budget law was adopted in 1996 to complement the constitution. The fundamental change was the introduction of so called expenditure limits (utgiftstak) for three years ahead. Each year, the budget specifies the expenditures (net of interest expenditures) for the next year within the previously decided limit and a new spending limit is decided for the third year.
Appendix A -The "old debt" (1719-1776)
There have been several attempts to calculate the Swedish government debt at the time of the death of King Karl XII. The most ambitious was made by Julén (1916 Åmark (1961, p. 599 ) recalculated the figure to approximately 64 million dsm. He pointed out that it is difficult to estimate the "true" debt. Some debts were not known until later, while some were uncertain and no demands were ever made to collect them. Especially the entry "other debt" is very uncertain. The debts in the first three entries were to be paid by the newly formed National Debt Office, entry four and five were to be paid by the government (Statsverket). The last entry in the table was to be partly paid by the National Debt Office, partly by the government budget office and some part was, due to different reasons, not repaid at all.
We calculate the debt at the end of 1719 to 46.8 million dsm. If we add the amortization and devaluation during 1719, we arrive at a figure of 63.1 millions at the end of 1718. One should note that we have used a different figure for the bank debt. If we use the figure presented by Åmark and Julén, our estimate of the debt at the end of 1718 will be 64.6 million dsm. For additional information on the "old debt" see Åmark (1961) and Julén (1916) .
In the following sections, we estimate separately the evolution of the different parts of the debt. Through a combination of information on initial debt, amortization and final debt, we estimate the evolution of the debt. Depending on the type of information, we estimate the evolution backwards or forwards in time.
A.1 -Insurance-and Salary-notes (Försäkrings-och löningssedlar)
The insurance-notes emanate from the issue of token coins, mynttecken, during 1715-1718 to pay for war expenditures. These were copper coins imprinted with 1 dsm, which contained much less copper than the full-bodied copper coins of 1 dsm. The token coins were to be redeemed with full-bodied copper coins at some later unspecified date. The token coins were issued in nine series, where each new series was supposed to replace the preceding series. The plan did not work out, and from a total nominal issuance of 40.4 million dsm, 24.5 millions (Åmark 1961, p. 5) were still circulating in May 1719. In addition to token coins, the government issued token bills (myntsedlar) in denominations of 5, 10 and 25 dsm to a total value of 2.6 million dsm.
Soon these notes and coins suffered severe depreciation and in April 1719 it was decided that all circulating token money should be withdrawn from circulation. After discussions in the parliament, it was determined that the token money should be presented to the local government representative and in eight days time the owner should be repaid. For each dsm, the bearer received 2 öre (the token coin reprinted) and a so-called insurance-note (försäkringssedel) worth 14 öre, which should "be redeemed whenever the crown had the ability to do so". Since 1 dsm was equal to 32 öre for the full-bodied copper coins, and 1 dsm in token money was now redeemed at 16 öre, the token money had been devalued by 50 percent. All token money not presented to the government officials in due time was cost its legal lender status. (This decision was later changed, see below.)
Our first problem is to approximate the total value of token money in circulation at the time of the devaluation. Åmark (1961, p. 5) estimated the value of token coins in May 1719 to 24.5 million dsm and the value of token bills at the beginning of 1719 to 2.07 million dsm. Julén (1916, p. 26 ) estimated the value of token money to 26 638 136 dsm at the death of King Karl XII in November 1718. Finally, Montelius (p. 81 in Sveriges Riksbank V) reported the value of token coins to approximately 25.4 million dsm in April 1719. He did not specify the number of token bills, but pointed out that as soon as in December 1717, the government declared that the bills should be exchanged against token coins.
With the above in mind we assume that token money to a value of 26 millions dsm (token coins to value of 24.5 million dsm and token bills to a value of 1.5 million) were still circulating at the time of the devaluation.
In the main books of the National Debt Office, no distinction is made between the insurance-notes and the so-called salary-notes (löningssedlar), why we have to calculate the repayment of these two simultaneously. The salary-notes were interest-bearing promissory notes that in 1715 had been given as compensation for unpaid wages to officers and other civil servants. These notes were issued to a total value of 1 220 927 dsm. Thus we approximate the total debt of the token money plus the salary-notes to 27 220 927 dsm.
At the riksdag in 1723 it was decided to dispense with the system with token coins permanently. All 2 öres token coins should be exchanged against 2 öres insurance-notes. If they were not exchanged, the value of the coin should be 1 öre. In addition, it was determined that all token coins should hold a value of 1 öre, even coins that not had been reprinted at the first devaluation. That meant that all token coins that had went out of circulation in 1719 was once again useable. In 1728 the same procedure were carried out with the token bills.
Thus, the reduction of this part of the debt took place in three ways. First, through devaluation, as described above; second, insurance-and salary-notes were redeemed; and third, part of the debt was written off due to the fact that not all token money were handed in. The values that were redeemed are taken from Åmark (1961, p. 704) and the debt reductions due to the devaluation's and writing off is calculated under the assumption that token money to a value of 26 million dsm were in circulation as a starting point. 4 The results of these calculations are presented in table A.1 below. 4 We assume that the total value of the token money before the devaluation were 26 million dsm. The National Debt Office issues 14 öres insurance-notes to a value of 8 730 417 dsm (Åmark 1961, p. 685) . This correspond to a value of 19 955 238 dsm before the devaluation (8 730 417 * 32/14). Reprinted token money to a value of 1 247 202 dsm enter circulation (19 955 238 * 2/32). Thus the reduction in debt due to the devaluation was then 9 997 619 dsm (19 995 238 * 0.5). Since we have assumed that the initial value of the token money was 26 million dsm, this means that token money to a value of 6 044 762 dsm (26 000 000 − 19 955 238) not were handed in. All token money not handed in were now of no value, why the debt was reduced by these additional 6 044 762 dsm. In all, the devaluation plus the token money not handed in reduced the debt by 16 042 381 dsm. In 1723 and 1728, a second and third devaluation took place. Outstanding token money had a value of 1 247 202 dsm, which should be exchanged to 2 öres insurance notes. However, the National Debt Office only issued 2 öres insurance-notes to a value of 201 584 dsm (Åmark 1961, p. 685) , which means that token money to a value of 1 045 618 dsm were not handed in. Since the token money not handed in were devalued by 50 percent, the debt was reduced by 522 809 dsm. As can be seen from the fifth column of table A.1, these transactions result in a debt in 1777 of 1 943 337 dsm. This figure does not match the known debt in 1777 given by Åmark (1961, p. 712) , 1 070 718 dsm. The discrepancy is due to a number of factors. First, we have assumed that the value of the token money was 26 million dsm before the first devaluation. The true figure might be something like half a million less or more. Second, token money was still in circulation. After the three devaluations, token money to a value of approximately 712 000 dsm still existed. These were never officially withdrawn, but gradually disappeared. Third, there exist discrepancies in the figures in Åmark (1961) . This is due to the fact that some data come from the National Debt Office and some from the government proper and these do not exactly match.
With no further information available, we add the discrepancy (872 619 dsm) to the debt reduction. This is done by adding a percentage of the total discrepancy in each period. We choose to use the same percentage as the redeemed notes in each period out of the total redeemed notes. The discrepancies are presented in the second last column, and the final calculated debt in the last column of table A.1.
A.2 -The number debt (Nummergälden)
The number debt was the second largest part of the debt in 1718. It included everything from bonds and bills to debts in grain; some debts were domestic, other foreign. The creditors were private persons as well as institutions (for instance the Church).
The name came from the fact that it was divided in groups which were labeled with numbers 1 to 11 plus one group "without number". The groups were to be paid off according to the importance of the creditors with group 1 first and the group "without number" last. How the creditors were to be grouped was a political issue, as was how much of the debt should be paid off. Gradually more debts were included in the number debt. We include all debts in the amount for 1718, even if some were recognized later.
Another problem is the so-called interest notes. In 1720 it was decided that first the principal should be paid off, while interest payments should be postponed. Interest notes were issued which were to be redeemed after the principal was paid off. We include all issued interest notes as part of the debt in 1718.
We use table 70 (p. 704), table 72 (p. 706-707) and some information on pages 710-712 in Åmark (1961) . We make use of the known debt in 1777, which was 494 808 dsm (Åmark 1961, p. 712) . We then use the known repayments to calculate backwards to 1719.
The total number debt in (May) 1719 is higher than the figure presented by Julén (1916) . This is due to that part of the number debt is included in "other debt" in Julén (1916). 
A.3 -Various creditors (Diverse kreditorer)
The figures summarized under this heading are debts that should have been administered by the National Debt Office, but since they where considered urgent they where left to the government budget office (Statskontoret). These debts were part of the "other debt" in Juléns (1916) Payments to "various creditors" were present in the budget until 1777, why we assume that this part of the debt was fully repaid that year. The debt figures are then calculated backwards using the known amortizations.
A.4 -The non-interest bearing loans with real assets as collateral (Kronoförpantningar)
We lack information on the repayments (or buy-backs) of kronoförpantningar, why we have to interpolate between some known figures. Since this part of the debt was small, this will not have any significant influence on the total figures. According to Åmark (1961, p. 604) half of these loans were paid back around 1741. This means that something like 1.1-1.2 million dsm were amortized until this time. Generalförrådskassan settled part of the debt (approximately 0.5 million dsm) during 1726-1739. The remaining 675 000 dsm is evenly divided during the years 1719-1741, that is, 29 328 dsm per year.
In 1742-1744 new loans through kronorförpantingar, to the value of 260 000 dsm, were taken up. After 1744, we lack information on repayments. We know that one of the military pension funds (Wadstena krigsmanshuskassa) settled loans to a value of approximate 80 000 dsm between 1749 and 1755. In 1759 there was a loan from the Riksbank present in the government budget (430 230 dsm), which was supposed to be used to amortize kronoförpantningar. Finally, in the government budget under the heading "temporary large expenditures", a total sum of approximately 1.6 million dsm is listed for the years 1759, 1768 and 1769 Åmark (1961, p. 397) . Since the system with kronoförpantningar had virtually disappeared by the late 1760s Åmark (1961, p. 608), we assume that these 1.6 millions were used to finally redeem the last of these non-interest bearing loans. 
A.5 -Debt to the Riksbank
The figures on the debt to the Riksbank come from the main ledgers of the Riksbank. These figures do not exactly match them of the government why there in some cases exist some minor discrepancies compared to the figures in Åmark (1961). 
A.6 -The "old debt", including debt to the Riksbank (1719-1777)
This table is the sum of table A.1. -A.5. Since the general ledgers of the National Debt Office were constructed on four-year basis, we simply divide these sums by four to get approximated yearly figures on amortizations. An exception from this is the devaluation of the token money, where we know in which year these took place (1719, 1723 and 1728). Åmark (1961) . These tables contain the government budget incomes from loans and debt-service data. We also make use of the inventories of government debt that were made in 1764 and 1777 (Åmark 1961, p. 622-624) .
B.1 -The lottery loans (Lotterilånen)
In 1757 Sweden became involved in the "Seven years war" and in 1758 the government was in need of new financing. It was decided to organize a lottery to raise money. Two large "lottery loans" were issued in 1758 and 1759. The prizes from the lotteries could be described as premium bonds.
The lottery loan of 1758 contained 50 000 lottery tickets of 50 dsm, which gave the government an income of 2 500 000 dsm. Every ticket paid a prize: 48 000 tickets paid 50 dsm and 2 000 tickets paid higher prizes totaling 596 833 dsm. In total the lottery prizes amounted to 2 996 833 dsm. From this the crown deducted, 6 percent on lower prizes and 15 percent on higher prizes (144 000 plus 89 525). That is, total prizes to a sum of 2 763 308 dsm were to be paid out. The prizes were in the form of interest bearing bonds, which matured after 6 years.
The lottery of 1759 contained 50 000 lottery ticket of 66 and 2/3 dsm, which gave the government an income of 3 333 333 dsm. Every ticket paid a prize: 40 000 tickets paid 66 & 2/3 dsm and 10 000 tickets paid higher sums to a total of 1 220 200 dsm. This time the crown did not deduct anything and the total prize sum was 3 886 867 dsm. The prizes were once again in the form of interest bearing bonds, which matured after 10 years.
The bonds from the first loan were redeemed according to plan in 1764 (Åmark, 1961) . When the second loan expired, the funds allocated for redemption had been used for other purposes. Only part of the bonds could be redeemed (approximately 2.78 million of the total sum of 3.89 million) as planned. The rest of the bondholders had their bonds exchanged for new bonds, at 6 percent interest. These bonds were renewed every year until the holder wanted to get it redeemed. This meant that the liquidation of this loan took along time and in 1777, bonds to a value of 538 000 dsm still remained. We have no information on how the bonds were redeemed between 1769 and 1777, why we have to interpolate. We make use of the debt service figures (Åmark p. 610) and assume that the same percent of the debt service sums were amortized every year. That gives the figures in table A.7. The debt service figures should give some guidance, since the holder had to notify 6 months in advance if he wanted to redeem his bond.
For additional information of the lottery loans see Åmark (1961) and Borg (1905) . 
B.2 -Other domestic loans (Övriga inrikes lån)
Data on the category "other domestic loans" are scant and we must rely heavily on approximations and interpolations. Since these loans constitute only a minor part of the total loans, the errors should be small. Some minor loans were taken up between 1751-1759, for the building of the lock at Trollhättan (1751 and 1759) and for the rebuilding of the royal castle (1754). The first large loans were the loan from the Swedish East India Company (2 million dsm in 1762) and the so-called "copper loan" (approximately 3 million dsm in 1762-64). Additional loans were taken up in 1763-64 according to the government budget (Åmark 1961 p. 609). The exact timing and size of the loans taken up during 1762-64 is uncertain (with exception for the loan from the East India Company). Since the information is not clear, we place the whole copper loan in 1763 and then add 1 210 641 dsm in 1763 and 1764 to reach the known figure of 1764 (7 793 281 dsm). The debt-service figures are diminutive so we assume that no amortizations were done. The values of the known debt in 1764 and 1777 are similar, but this does not mean that there was no activity during the period. Repayments were made during 1766-1769 and new loans were taken up during the latter part of the interval. Since exact data on new loans and especially on amortizations are scarce, we start by making a linear interpolation between 1764 and 1777, and from these figures add new loans and subtract repayments. We add known new loans during 1772, 1775-1777 (Åmark 1961 p. 618-619) and subtract amortizations. The most noticeable new loan was the so-called "general loan" (allmänna lånet) of 2.2 million dsm, which was taken up between 1775 and 1777. The figures in the government budget was much higher than ours concerning new loans, but since these figures only are budget figures we choose to use data on known new loans listed by Åmark (1961) .
Regarding the amortization debt-service figure seem far too high. The only exact known repayments are to the East India Company (500 000 dsm per year during 1766-1769). Part of the "copper-loan" was repaid in 1766, why we add the remaining (1 461 000 dsm) to get the actual sum in 1777. (Note that by doing the linear interpolation and then add new loans and subtract amortizations, t B will not be equal to 
B.3 -Foreign loans (Utrikes lån)
The foreign loans taken up between 1759 and 1764 are all short-term loans (Åmark 1961 p. 619). We use the debt-service data in (Åmark 1961 p. 610) to get some information on the repayments. Since the debt-service figures do not separate amortization from interest payments, we have to approximate the repayments. We observe data on amortizations and/or interest payments in the debt-service figures for the years 1762-1764. Further we have a known debt sum for 1764. We then calculate the proportion that has to be amortized (out of the total figures 1764-1766), and assume that the same percentage of the debt service is amortization each year. We proceed in the same way for the years 1765-1766, assuming that all short-term loans are repaid at the end of 1766. There are obviously some sources of error in doing so. The installment percentage might be very different over the years, and since the debt-service figures are based on budget data, it may be the case that only some or none of the debt-service was actually paid.
Long-term loans were taken up from 1766. Since the sum of these loans, taken up between 1766 and 1776 (Åmark 1961 p. 628-629) exactly match the debt in 1777 (Åmark 1961 p. 623-624), we can assume that no amortization were made during this period. Appendix C -The "special funds" and the National Debt Office 
Appendix E -Swedish central government debt 1777-1857

Appendix F -Swedish central government debt 1858-2003
Appendix G -Interest payments 1722-1777
For the 1722-1742 period the debt service include interest payments plus amortizations to "various creditors" (Åmark, 1961, p. 608) . Interest payments include payments to public depositories, an internal transaction. We calculate government interest payments as: debt service minus the sum of interest payments to public depositories (given in Åmark (1961, p. 601 ) and amortizations to "various creditors". For the 1743-1777 period we have to approximate the interest payments, since the debt service figures does not separate between interest payments and amortizations. We calculate interest payments separately for each part of the debt; the debt to the Riksbank, the lottery loans, other domestic loans and foreign loans. The interest payments to the Riksbank is calculated as the interest rate times the debt at the end of the last period. The interest rate was 6 percent during 1743-1755 and 3 percent during 1756-1777. During 1769-1771 no interest payments were made at all (Åmark, 1961, p. 611-616) .
The interest payments for the lottery loans can be calculated exactly during 1758-1769. (Different rates were paid depended on the size of the prize; see Borg (1905) for exact interest rates.)For the period 1770-1777 we approximate the interest payments as: . An approximation of a 6% interest is reasonable, since the large loans from the Swedish East India Company, the so-called "copper loan" and the "general loan" were running with a 6% interest rate. That is, all large loans in this category had a 6% interest rate (Åmark, 1961, p. 618) .
The interest payments on foreign loans are calculated as: . This should be a good approximation since most foreign loans had a 5% interest rate. Only the new loans in late 1775 and 1776 were procured at a different rate (4%) (Åmark, 1961, p.628-629) .
Kronoförpantningar and the insurance-and salary-notes were non-interest bearing and as far as we can tell no interest was paid on the debt to "various creditors".
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Appendix H -Expenditures, revenues and deficits 1722-1809
Appendix I -Investment expenditures 1854-1911
Appendix J -Expenditures, revenues and deficits 1810-1911
Appendix K -Expenditures, revenues and deficits 1912-2003
Appendix L -Fiscal seigniorage
B ):
This variable is presented under various headings in the above stated references. For the 1829-1899 period, the data from the official records of the parliament sessions. Also, for the period 1789-1828 we have added the riksgäldssedlar to the debt owned by the central bank (see section 4.2).
The central governments financial assets ( t A ):
We have assumed that all financial assets are deposited at the Riksbank. Before 1908 government deposits are not clearly separated from all other deposits. The entries used, however, always contained mainly government assets (Brisman, 1931, p.39) .
Riksbank transfers to the central government ( t CBT ): These transfers started in 1824 but did not become regular until the mid-1860s. For the period up until 1911 the data is taken from Sveriges Riksbank (1924) and from 1911 from the state budget. These transfers were made to the National Debt Office until 1877 and from 1878 to the government proper (statsverket).
The 
